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Abstract
As the novel coronavirus spreads across the world, concerns
regarding the spreading of misinformation about it are also
growing. Here we estimate the prevalence of links to low-
credibility information on Twitter during the outbreak, and
the role of bots in spreading these links. We find that the the
combined volume of tweets linking to various low-credibility
information is comparable to the volume of New York Times
articles and CDC links. Content analysis reveals a politiciza-
tion of the pandemic. The majority of this content spreads
via retweets. Social bots are involved in both posting and
amplifying low-credibility information, although the major-
ity of volume is generated by likely humans. Some of these
accounts appear to amplify low-credibility sources in a coor-
dinated fashion.
Introduction
As we write this paper, most countries across the world are
experiencing an unprecedented outbreak of the novel coron-
avirus (COVID-19). Millions of people have tested positive
for the virus and tens of thousands people have died from it
globally (coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html). At the same time,
we have observed an increase of approximately 25% in Twit-
ter volume.
With millions of people stuck in their homes and access-
ing information via social media, concerns about the spread
of misinformation about the pandemic (referred to as “in-
fodemic” (Zarocostas 2020)) have mounted. Social media
have been known to facilitate the spread of misinforma-
tion (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018), manipulation (Stella,
Ferrara, and De Domenico 2018), and radicalization of
users (Thompson 2011). These issues are even more press-
ing in the current atmosphere since the information flow-
ing through social media is directly related to the health and
safety of the people.
In response, quite a few research papers have been made
public lately that estimate the prevalence of COVID19-
related misinformation on social media (Cinelli et al. 2020;
Pulido et al. 2020; Laato et al. 2020) and characterize the
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behaviors of inauthentic actors (Gallotti et al. 2020; Fer-
rara 2020). These studies use different methods on different
datasets and yield different perspectives on the issue. How-
ever, given the complex nature of the problem, many ques-
tions remain unanswered. In this paper, we use a random
sample of tweets to estimate the prevalence of COVID19-
related low-credibility information on Twitter and further
characterize the role of social bots (Ferrara et al. 2016;
Shao et al. 2018).
Methods
Identification of low-credibility information
Identification of false information often requires fact-
checking from experts, which is extremely time consum-
ing and therefore not viable for this analysis. Instead, we
focus on the URLs embedded in the tweets and annotate
the credibility of the content not at the URL level but at
the domain level following the literature (Shao et al. 2018;
Grinberg et al. 2019; Guess, Nagler, and Tucker 2019; Pen-
nycook and Rand 2019; Bovet and Makse 2019; Vosoughi,
Roy, and Aral 2018).
We compiled a list of low-credibility (including hyperpar-
tisan) sources from several lists used in recent research. Our
list includes sources that fulfill any one of the following cri-
teria: (1) labeled as low-credibility by Shao et al. (Shao et
al. 2018); (2) labeled as “Black” or “Red” or “Satire” by
Grinberg et al. (Grinberg et al. 2019); (3) labeled as “fake-
news” or “hyperpartisan” by Pennycook et al. (Pennycook
and Rand 2019); or (4) labeled as “extremeleft” or “ex-
tremeright” or “fakenews” by Bovet et al. (Bovet and Makse
2019). This gives us a list of 570 low-credibility sources.
Data collection
We collected two datasets using different methods to answer
different questions.
DS1 consists of tweets containing a set of hashtags
and links. Various hashtags are associated to the coron-
avirus (Chen, Lerman, and Ferrara 2020), but some are
focused on certain aspects of the outbreak and some re-
flect certain biases. To provide a general and unbiased
view of the discussion, we chose two generic hashtags
#coronavirus and #covid19 as our seeds. Our data
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was collected using an API from the Observatory on Social
Media, which allows to search tweets from a 10% random
sample of public tweets (Davis et al. 2016). This dataset con-
sists of tweets from Mar. 9–29, 2020.
Estimating the prevalence of low-credibility information
requires matching the URL domains from the tweets against
the list defined above. To include all links from the tweet
objects obtained through the API, we used a regular ex-
pression to extract any URL-like strings from the tweet text
in addition to fetching URLs from the entity metadata. For
retweets, we also included the URLs in the original tweets
using the same method.
Since shortened URLs are very common, we identified
those from 70 most frequent shortening services and ex-
panded the URLs through HTTP requests to obtain the real
domains. The expanded URLs were further cleaned. We re-
moved those linking to Twitter itself, which turn out to be
the majority, and those linking to other social media sites.
While these links might still lead to low-credibility infor-
mation, there is no easy way to verify, so we exclude them
in this study. The remaining links mainly belong to news
outlets and authorities like government agencies. The DS1
is the set of tweets that match the COVID-19 hashtags and
containing any of these links.
DS2 starts from a collection of tweets containing links
to low-credibility sources. The data was collected using the
Twitter streaming/filter API from Feb. 1 to Apr. 27, 2020.
The URLs were extracted and the corresponding web pages
were fetched. To reveal common low-credibility information
topics, we analyzed the titles of the linked articles and re-
tained those with keywords “coronavirus” and “covid.” We
ranked the links by the number of tweets containing them
and extracted the top 1,200. Each URL in DS2 has been
shared at least 50 times.
Bot detection
Social bots are social media accounts controlled in part by
algorithms (Ferrara et al. 2016). Malicious bots are known
to spread low-credibility information (Shao et al. 2018) as
well as creating confusion in the online debate about health-
related topics like vaccination (Broniatowski et al. 2018). It
is therefore interesting to characterize the role of social bots
in spreading COVID19-related low-credibility information.
We adopt BotometerLite (Yang et al. 2019), a bot detec-
tion model that enables large-scale bot detection. By strate-
gically selecting a subset of the training dataset, Botome-
terLite achieves high accuracy in cross-validation as well
as cross-domain tests. BotometerLite generates a score be-
tween 0 and 1 for every account, with higher scores indicat-
ing bot-like profiles. For binary classification of accounts we
use a threshold of 0.5 in this paper.
Results
Prevalence of low-credibility information
To report on the prevalence of low-credibility information,
we obtain reference volume levels using links to the New
York Times, a mainstream news source, and the CDC, an of-
ficial source of critical information related to the outbreak.
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Figure 1: Prevalence of low-credibility, nytimes, and
cdc.gov links in DS1, at the level of (a) tweets and (b) users.
Percentage of (c) retweets and (d) tweets by likely bots for
low-credibility, nytimes, cdc.gov, and overall links in DS1.
Our results show that links to low-credibility sources com-
bined contribute 0.89% of the total tweet volume in DS1
(Fig. 1(a)). For comparison, nytimes.com contributes 0.98%
and cdc.gov contributes less than 0.65%. To account for the
fact that some users might share certain information repeat-
edly, we provide the same analysis at the level of users, i.e.,
the percentage of users who shared the corresponding links
at least once, in Fig. 1(b). The results are qualitatively sim-
ilar. These findings suggest that low-credibility information
is not rampant on Twitter, but it does have a volume share
comparable with highly reliable sources.
We also show the percentage of retweets for differ-
ent sources in Fig. 1(c). About 68% of the links to low-
credibility information are shared by retweets. For compari-
son, this fraction is about 54% for nytimes.com and all URLs
together in DS1. This suggests that users involved with low-
credibility information on Twitter are more likely to share
links posted by others. Interestingly, cdc.gov has an even
hither retweet rate.
Role of social bots
We report the percentage of tweets posted by social bots for
different sources in Fig. 1(d). A significantly higher ratio
of the volume of low-credibility information is shared by
likely bot accounts, compared to the volume of tweets link-
ing to reliable sources and the overall baseline. Since some
accounts post multiple tweets with the same link, affecting
the bot ratio estimation, we also perform the same analysis
at the user level (not shown in Fig. 1). The bot ratios be-
come 12.1%, 6.5%, 10.6%, and 11.7% for low-credibility,
13.3% 6.8% 11.0%
29.0% 2.7% 0.8%
(a) low-credibility sites (b) nytimes.com (c) cdc.gov
Figure 2: Joint distribution of bot scores of tweeters and retweeters for (a) low-credibility information; (b) nytimes.com; and
(c) cdc.gov. Annotations show the tweet volumes contributed by likely bots.
nytimes.com, cdc.gov, and overall links, respectively. The
decreases in bot volume ratio compared to the tweet-level
analysis suggest that low-credibility links are amplified by
hyper-active bots. These results are consistent with previous
findings (Shao et al. 2018).
Let us focus on retweets to characterize the interaction
between original posters of links and accounts that amplify
the reach of those links. The results for different sources are
shown in Fig. 2. For low-credibility information, although
the majority of tweets and retweets are posted by human-
like accounts, we do see a higher-than-normal participation
rate of bot accounts in both posting and amplifying the con-
tent. We also find that bot-like tweeters attract more bot-like
retweeters than human-like tweeters (see highlighted oval in
Fig. 2(a)), despite a majority of human-like retweeters.
We see in Fig. 2(b) that bot participation is much lower
for nytimes.com than low-credibility sources. The pattern
for cdc.gov is interesting (Fig. 2(c)). Original posting is
dominated by the official account @CDCgov, whereas the
retweeters have a much broader score spectrum with a rel-
atively high proportion of bot-like accounts. This suggests
that some bots are also trying to disseminate useful informa-
tion, in agreement with previous findings (Ferrara 2020).
Coordinated amplification of low-credibility
information
Let us build a network of shared low-credibility domains to
highlight potentially coordinated groups of accounts ampli-
fying misinformation (Pacheco et al. 2020). We focus on ac-
counts that share at least 3 links. Then we extract domains
from shared links to low-credibility sources, and represent
an account as a vector of such domains. We finally calculate
the cosine similarity between each pair of account vectors
and use it as a network weight.
The resulting network is shown in Fig. 3. We note a few
densely connected clusters of accounts, which share links
to many of the same low-credibility sources. Although this
network is not dominated by accounts with high bot scores,
manual inspection reveals that several of the accounts gen-
erate suspiciously high volumes of partisan content.
Topics from low-credibility sources
We wish to provide a sense of the common topics of linked
articles from low-credibility sources. Fig. 4 depicts the most
frequent words in the titles of the articles in DS2, excluding
the query terms “coronavirus” and “covid.” Popular topics
covered by low-credibility sources are U.S. politics, the sta-
tus of the outbreak, and economic issues.
This analysis suggests a politicization of the pandemic.
An example revolves around claims that the COVID-19 pan-
demic originated from a weaponized virus. One of the most
popular sources pushing this narratives is ZeroHedge.com,
the third most-shared low-credibility domain in our dataset.
Notably, this occurs despite the fact that Twitter sus-
pended the ZeroHedge account for violating the platform’s
manipulation policy at the beginning of the pandemic
(bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-01/zero-hedge-
permanently-suspended-from-twitter-for-harassment).
Discussion
We characterize the prevalence of low-credibility informa-
tion on Twitter during the novel coronavirus outbreak. The
combined prevalence of various low-credibility sources is
comparable with mainstream and reliable sources. Consis-
tent with previous research, social bots are more likely to
get involved in posting and amplifying low-credibility in-
formation. Finally, we find evidence of coordinated activity
amplifying low-credibility content.
The analyses presented here are preliminary and have
several limitations. First, the sampling method based on
two hashtags might introduce unknown biases. Second, the
domain-based identification of low-credibility sources is not
exhaustive and cannot capture misinformation contained in
the content of tweets like text, images, and videos. Third,
it is impossible to draw any conclusion about impact from
Figure 3: Similarity network of accounts sharing links to
low-credibility sources. Nodes are colored using a human-
like (blue) to bot-like (red) scheme and size is proportional
to strength (weighted degree). Edge weights represent co-
sine similarity among link vectors (see text). Only links
with weight above 0.8 are shown, and singleton nodes af-
ter this filtering are removed. The final network consists of
180 nodes and 1,343 edges.
the prevalence of misinformation alone. Fourth, bot detec-
tion algorithms are never perfectly accurate and may have
biases stemming from training data. And fifth, our coordi-
nation analysis may be distorted by popular sources. More
thorough analyses are needed to confirm as well as expand
our findings.
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